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We explain why family-centered noneconomic goals and bounded rationality decrease the 
willingness and ability of small- and medium-sized family firms to hire and provide competitive 
compensation to nonfamily managers even in a labor market composed of stewards rather than 
agents. Family-centered noneconomic goals attenuate the ability to attract high-quality, 
nonfamily managers by promoting inferior total compensation packages, fewer opportunities for 
advancement, idiosyncratic strategies, and higher performance expectations. Furthermore, 
bounded rationality limits nonfamily managers' ability to meet performance expectations when 
hired. The result is the “winner's curse,” where neither the economic nor noneconomic goals of 
family owners are fully achieved. 
 






The limited ability and willingness of family firms to compete in the market for managerial labor 
(Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; 
Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Verbeke & Kano, 2010), as well as the differences in the compensation 
practices of family and nonfamily firms (Combs, Penney, Crook, & Short, 2010; Ensley, 
Pearson, & Sardeshmukh, 2007; Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; 
McConaughy, 2000; Park, 2002), have been frequently discussed. 1 Prior work suggests that the 
competitive disadvantages of family firms in the managerial labor market and the seemingly 
irrational behavior of hiring less capable family managers largely stem from a desire to minimize 
agent opportunism and maximize the achievement of family-centered, noneconomic goals 
associated with maintaining family control of the firm and behaving altruistically toward family 
members (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2002; Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Ilias, 2006; 
Lee, Lim, & Lim, 2003). 2 However, some scholars argue that in many situations, stewardship 
theory rather than agency theory better characterizes family firms (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). If 
so, the relationship between family owners and nonfamily managers needs to be reconsidered 
because stewardship theory provides an alternative conceptualization of cooperative 
relationships that depend on collectivistic rather than individualistic motives (Davis, Schoorman, 
& Donaldson, 1997). 
 
However, the efforts of stewards, as well as those of agents and owners, are bounded by 
imperfect and asymmetric information (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 1994; Simon, 1945). Bounded 
rationality implies that there are limits to the ability of stewards to align their interests with those 
of the organization, as well as limits to the ability of owners to properly evaluate the pro-
organizational intentions, abilities, and actions of stewards. The validity of the bounded 
rationality argument is well understood, yet no one has attempted to consider how, in 
conjunction with family-centered, noneconomic goals, it influences the hiring and compensation 
decisions of family owners with respect to nonfamily managers who might behave as stewards. 
Indeed, if bounded rationality is important, the precontractual conditions and expectations of 
nonfamily managers and family owners may take on a heightened significance even if the threat 
of opportunism is eliminated or reduced. By focusing on situations where stewardship operates, 
how those conditions and expectations influence behaviors can be better understood. 
 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to explain why family-centered, noneconomic goals and 
bounded rationality decrease the willingness and ability of small- and medium-sized family firms 
to hire and provide competitive compensation to nonfamily managers, even if those managers are 
more talented than available family managers and the labor market is composed of stewards 
rather than agents. 3 We will show how these issues are interrelated by discussing the supply and 
demand sides of the managerial labor market as it concerns family firms. Furthermore, while 
previous discussions have assumed, rightly, that family firms based their decisions regarding the 
hiring and compensation of nonfamily managers on the particularistic pursuit of family-centered, 
noneconomic goals that create socioemotional wealth (Carney, 2005; Chua et al., 2009; Schulze 
et al., 2001), we argue that there is also an underlying economic rationale for such decisions that 
has nothing to do with agent opportunism. Since family and nonfamily firms must compete and 
bid for talent in the managerial labor market, we draw upon economic utility and bidding 
theories (Hicks, 1939; Thaler, 1988) in our analysis. We focus on small- and medium-sized firms 
because, as explained below, firm size can affect the nature of the hiring and compensation 
decisions of family firms. 
 
This paper contributes to the family firm literature by discussing the economic and noneconomic 
factors that influence the participation of small- and medium-sized family firms in managerial 
labor markets. On the supply side, our analysis shows that the family-centered, noneconomic 
goals of family firms lead to human resource policies in regard to hiring, compensation, and 
promotion that limit the available pool of management talent, creating a “lemons” problem 
(Akerlof, 1970) that stewardship cannot eliminate. 4 Our analysis also suggests that bounded 
rationality, noneconomic goals, and the tendency to follow idiosyncratic strategies create 
uncertainties that contribute to the reluctance of nonfamily managers to work in family firms. 
Thus, stewards as well as agents prefer to work for firms that they perceive to be compatible with 
their interests, and pro-organizational behavior with respect to a specific firm cannot exist prior 
to the consummation of the employment contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1994). 
 
On the demand side, we show how trade-offs between economic and noneconomic goals can 
lead to higher performance expectations for nonfamily managers in family firms relative to the 
performance expectations for both (1) family managers in family firms and (2) nonfamily 
managers in nonfamily firms. This comes about because hiring a nonfamily manager usually 
means giving up noneconomic goals to achieve economic goals. 5 However, the economic 
concept of diminishing marginal utility suggests that family owners should be willing to give up 
less and less of a desired noneconomic benefit to obtain more and more of a desired economic 
benefit if the same level of utility is to be maintained (Hicks, 1939; Marshall, 1890). This well-
known concave utility function (i.e., a nonlinear, inverted U-shape function) means that 
achievement of economic goals increases utility at a decreasing rate (movement to the right 
along the inverted U-shape function), and that the sacrifice of noneconomic goals decreases 
utility at an increasing rate (movement to the left along the inverted U-shape function). Thus, 
assuming the ability of an individual manager is fixed in the short term, there is an increasing 
probability that as family-centered, noneconomic goals become more important, the performance 
improvements generated by employing nonfamily managers will be lower than the performance 
expectations of family owners. The probability that performance expectations will not be 
achieved will further increase if the family firm follows an idiosyncratic strategy, owing to the 
bounded rationality of nonfamily managers. This “winner's curse”—overbidding or overpaying 
for nonfamily managers relative to their ability to contribute to firm goals (Capen, Clapp, & 
Campbell, 1971; Thaler, 1988)—suggests that family owners are more likely to maximize their 
utility by hiring family managers even though hiring nonfamily managers might lead to higher 
economic performance. 
 
In short, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a new perspective on the 
precontractual employment decisions of family owners as well as nonfamily managers. We do 
this by relaxing the standard assumption about opportunism and replace it with an assumption of 
stewardship. This allows us to focus on how the attempts of family owners to maximize the joint 
utilities associated with economic and noneconomic goals in the context of bounded rationality 
affect the hiring and compensation of nonfamily managers. We thereby show that family owners 
do not act irrationally, and that neither agent opportunism nor noneconomic goals alone provide 
sufficient explanations for their reluctance to hire nonfamily managers. 
 
Boundaries and Assumptions 
 
Before proceeding further, we must discuss our focus on small- and medium-sized family firms, 
and the boundary conditions and assumptions of our theoretical model. Following that, we 
describe supply-side considerations in the managerial labor market, which are dependent on the 
employment preferences of managers. Later in this paper, we will discuss the preferences of 
family owners that drive demand-side considerations. 
 
We focus on small- and medium-sized family firms because such firms are apt to face starker 
trade-offs in choosing between family and nonfamily managers, and therefore are better suited to 
illustrate the theoretical perspectives that we wish to emphasize. First, in such firms, the family 
will typically hold a majority ownership stake rather than simply a so-called controlling interest, 
as would be the case in large firms. Consequently, their decision-making discretion is greater 
(Carney, 2005), which also suggests that acts that might dilute that stake are potentially more 
significant. Furthermore, small- and medium-sized firms tend to be owner-managed, which 
means that a family member will typically hold the position of chief executive officer (CEO). 
Likewise, the management team (including the CEO) will typically be smaller and the types of 
responsibilities of these managers broader than in large firms (Cromie, Stephenson, & 
Monteith, 1995), in the sense that the top management team will often also undertake the roles 
and functions of middle and lower managers. Thus, maintaining family control of ownership and 
management is likely to be of greater concern in such organizations. However, in keeping with 
our focus on small- and medium-sized firms, we assume that family owners can choose between 
hiring from within or outside the family to fill management positions in the firm. In other words, 
we assume that there are family members available, and that the firm is not so large that hiring 
nonfamily managers is nevertheless required. Family firms are heterogeneous (Melin & 
Nordqvist, 2007), and as shall be discussed later, if hiring nonfamily managers becomes 
necessary for firm sustainability, the framing of the decision will be altered. Therefore, we limit 
our discussion to small- and medium-sized firms with families large enough to meet immediate 
managerial requirements. We also assume that the larger pool of nonfamily managers available 
in the labor market means that there are nonfamily managers who are more capable than family 
members. 
 
Second, a central assumption of the family business literature and of this paper is that the pursuit 
of family-centered, noneconomic goals that flow from family involvement and influence in a 
firm is a key factor distinguishing family and nonfamily firms (Chrisman, Chua, & 
Sharma, 2005) because such goals tend to lead to strategies and behaviors that are idiosyncratic 
in nature (Carney, 2005). The achievement of these goals leads to the creation of socioemotional 
wealth, and includes, among other things, the preservation of family values, harmony, social 
capital, and reputation, as well as the ability to behave altruistically toward family members 
(Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & 
Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). The accomplishment of these goals is 
dependent upon the family's control of the firm, and the importance of these goals increases the 
desirability of maintaining family control. 
 
Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) show that a desire to preserve socioemotional wealth may cause 
family firms to accept or avoid risk to their economic performance. They attribute this to family 
owners' being loss-averse with respect to their socioemotional wealth. In the general case, this 
leads family firms to follow risk-averse strategies in order to protect socioemotional wealth, but 
when firm performance is below aspirations, socioemotional wealth will sometimes be sacrificed 
to improve performance (Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010). These findings 
suggest that family firms are concerned with the trade-offs between economic and noneconomic 
goals that are necessary to maximize their overall utility. Consequently, we posit that they will 
react according to which utility they perceive to be threatened. 
 
Third, with regard to utilities, we assume that family owners will attempt to order their activities 
in such a way that their overall utility is maximized through the firm's achievement of economic 
and noneconomic goals, but marginal utility diminishes as more of a particular goal is achieved 
(Hicks, 1939; Marshall, 1890). By this, we mean that whenever there is a trade-off among goals, 
each additional unit of a desired goal will be less valuable than the previous unit because, given 
finite resources, the attainment of one goal reduces the ability to attain another desired goal. 
Thus, achieving more and more of a goal will increase utility, but the increase will occur at a 
decreasing rate. In other words, since individuals will be willing to give up less and less of one 
goal to obtain more and more of another, marginal utility increases at a decreasing rate when a 
goal is achieved, but declines at an increasing rate as goal achievement decreases. 
 
Fourth, we assume that nonfamily managers are stewards who maximize utility by aligning their 
goals with those of the firm and its principals (Davis et al., 1997). Both agency and stewardship 
theories are concerned with cooperative relationships among individuals. However, these 
theories have different assumptions regarding those relationships. Agency theory deals with 
conflicting goals and information asymmetries between principals and agents, and how the 
associated costs can be controlled through incentive and monitoring systems (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In contrast, stewardship theory draws on sociopsychological perspectives to study relations in 
organizations where members are collectivists in the sense that they value cooperative behaviors 
more than behaviors driven by self-interest (Davis et al.). Accordingly, the individuals' interests 
tend to be aligned with the interests of the organization, which would suggest that “pro-
organizational collectivistic behaviors have higher utility than individualistic self-serving 
behaviors” (Davis et al., p. 24). Hence, stewardship approaches to the study of family firms 
might be particularly relevant, as family firm members may value family firm objectives more 
highly than their individual objectives (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). 
 
If stewardship theory holds, there should be no conflict of interest between family owners and 
nonfamily stewards. The latter will not behave opportunistically by shirking, consuming perks, 
or otherwise following policies that contradict the goals of the owners of the firm. Likewise, 
even though stewardship theory is silent on how individuals will behave prior to joining an 
organization, we assume that stewards will not intentionally misrepresent their abilities, and 
therefore that issues of adverse selection are confined to those related to information 
asymmetries rather than dishonesty. However, since stewardship only comes into play after the 
employment contract is consummated, we follow Jensen and Meckling (1994) in assuming that 
individuals will seek to attach themselves to organizations that they perceive as the most 
compatible with their own intrinsic and extrinsic needs and aspirations. 
 
Finally, we assume that both owners and stewards are boundedly rational (Simon, 1945). By this, 
we mean that they attempt to act in a manner that will lead to the achievement of their goals 
(which later become aligned with the firm that hires them), but their ability to do so is bounded 
because they possess imperfect information and imperfect ability to process that information. In 
the context of the interactions and collaborations between owners and stewards, this suggests that 
they possess asymmetric information. Incomplete and asymmetric information is expected to 
lead to uncertainty with regard to the outcome of those interactions and collaborations, even 
when both parties behave in good faith. 6 Thus, as shall be illustrated below, adverse selection 
occurs when family firms enter the market for managerial labor in spite of the absence of 
opportunism because asymmetric information and sorting based on self-interest (but not self-
interest seeking with guile) creates a lemons market where differences in the quality of 





On the supply side of the managerial labor market, dissemination of information leads workers 
and employers to be sorted or matched according to their attributes (Becker, 1973; 
Williamson, 1990). Nonfamily managers use their social networks and other sources of 
information to search for available managerial positions. They assess attractiveness by 
comparing their direct knowledge about specific employers and their knowledge about classes of 
employers with their goals, preferences, and expectations (Klein & Bell, 2007; Krueger & 
Schkade, 2008; Miyazaki, 1977). To aid in this process, employers engage in signaling by 
providing information about the company and the position (Spence, 1973). Evidence suggests 
that managers are sorted, in part, by ability (Thaler, 1989), and therefore similar to high-quality 
employers, high-quality managers have an incentive to signal their ability in order to obtain more 
attractive and better paying positions (Albrecht & Vroman, 2002; Miyazaki; Spence). As a result 
of the sorting process, the average expected ability of job candidates from the pool of applicants 
for a higher paying position will be greater than that of job candidates for a lower paying 
position (Weiss, 1980). 
 
Nevertheless, and in contrast to economic theory (Thaler, 1989), the major source of differences 
in compensation among individuals in a given occupation is related to interindustry and firm-
level variations (Groshen, 1991; Levy & Murnane, 1992). In the case of family firms, it is well 
established that owing to the desire to maintain family control and behave altruistically toward 
family members, advancement opportunities for nonfamily managers are more limited compared 
with those of family managers, and nonfamily managers in nonfamily firms (Poza, Alfred, & 
Maheshwari, 1997; Schulze et al., 2001; Verbeke & Kano, 2010, 2012). Family firms are also 
reluctant to offer stock options or otherwise share the ownership of the firm with nonfamily 
managers, again because by doing so they reduce family control and involvement (Gedajlovic & 
Carney, 2010; McConaughy, 2000; Park, 2002). 
 
If the expectation of future income through firm ownership and career advancement is a factor in 
the managerial labor market, family firms will be at a disadvantage in hiring nonfamily managers 
unless they adjust the total compensation package they offer by paying higher current wages in 
the form of salary, bonuses, and profit sharing to make up for lower future income-earning 
opportunities. 7 This is consistent with the work of Gibbons and Murphy (1992), who show that 
compensation contracts should optimize the total compensation package. Therefore: 
 
 Proposition 1: To attract high-quality, nonfamily managers, small- and medium-sized 
family firms with intentions to maintain family control of firm ownership and 
management will need to offer higher current wages than small- and medium-sized, 
nonfamily firms in order to offset lower future income-earning opportunities within the 
firm. 
 
However, even if differences in current wages and future income-earning opportunities between 
family and nonfamily firms do not exist, the extent to which family firms pursue family-
centered, noneconomic goals beyond simply preserving family control will aggravate bounded 
rationality problems and lead nonfamily managers to prefer to work for nonfamily firms. In other 
words, whereas a family's desire to maintain control has the potential to unfavorably alter the 
rewards available to managers from the successful discharge of their duties, the pursuit of 
family-centered goals may unfavorably alter their probability of being successful. As explained 
below, to the extent that this occurs, family firms will be less desirable employers. 
 
Family-centered, noneconomic goals are harder to define and measure, meaning they are harder 
to communicate before or after a nonfamily manager takes a position with a family firm (Chua 
et al., 2009; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Therefore, even stewards will be hesitant to align themselves 
with family firms because neither their intrinsic nor extrinsic motivations are likely to be attained 
if asymmetric information makes goal alignment and achievement more difficult. Second, 
noneconomic goals are even more likely to vary among firm owners than economic goals 
(Schulze et al., 2001), which will further increase uncertainty and leave stewards little alternative 
but to concentrate on the economic goals of the firm (Davis et al., 1997). Given that stewards 
will select employers based on compatibilities that allow them to maximize utility, nonfamily 
firms that possess only or primarily economic goals would then represent a more desirable 
option. Third, family-centered, noneconomic goals are likely to be associated with idiosyncratic 
strategies (Carney, 2005; Lee et al., 2003), which can amplify the uncertainties associated with 
the achievement of economic goals (not to mention noneconomic goals), as well as inhibit 
efficient sorting (Moscarini, 2005; Williamson, 1990). 
 
These factors increase the risk of managerial failure, owing to bounded rationality (Lee 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, the idiosyncratic knowledge obtained working in family firms may be 
difficult to transfer to other contexts at a later date, extending to some extent the so-called family 
handcuff (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003) to nonfamily managers. Finally, since nonfamily managers 
are often treated as scapegoats when family firms fail to fulfill their economic aspirations 
(Gomez-Mejia, Núñez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001), the costs of managerial failure increase as 
well. 
 
To be willing to bear these risks and costs, we reason that nonfamily managers would expect to 
receive higher total compensation as compared with situations where such risks and costs are 
absent or lower (i.e., in nonfamily firms). Therefore, as stated below, we reason that high-quality 
managers will demand higher total compensation (current wages plus future income-earning 
opportunities) as recompense for the risk and costs they must incur in a family business setting, 
rather than just higher current wages to offset lower future income-earning opportunities. 
 
 Proposition 2: To the extent that small- and medium-sized family firms pursue 
idiosyncratic strategies and family-centered, noneconomic goals beyond simply 
maintaining family control, they will need to offer higher total compensation (current 
wages plus future income-earning opportunities) than small- and medium-sized, 
nonfamily firms to attract high-quality, nonfamily managers. 
 
Nevertheless, lower paying positions that offer nonpecuniary benefits, such as more attractive 
work environments, can offset pay differentials for workers whose utilities are maximized by 
that combination (Duncan & Holmlund, 1983; Hwang, Reed, & Hubbard, 1992). Family firms 
have been suggested to offer greater collegiality, employee care, and loyalty, less bureaucracy, 
better job security, and more flexible work practices than nonfamily firms (Block, 2011; 
Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Klein & Bell, 2007; Memili, Eddleston, Zellweger, Kellermanns, 
& Barnett, 2010; Poza et al., 1997). Therefore, nonfamily managers can choose between 
nonfamily firms that offer greater future income-earning opportunities and family firms that offer 
a better working environment. A better working environment appeals to everyone and requires 
no special skills. However, by definition, future income-earning opportunities require greater 
ability, which higher quality managers are more likely to possess than lower quality managers. 
Furthermore, the ability and willingness to pursue opportunities that demand exceptional ability 
tend to be correlated, suggesting that positive sorting in the labor market will occur 
(Becker, 1973; Chua et al., 2009; Miyazaki, 1977). This reasoning, in conjunction with our above 
discussion, indicates that the pool of managers available to nonfamily firms will be of higher 
average quality than the pool of managers who seek employment in family firms (cf. Albrecht & 
Vroman, 2002) even if the noneconomic benefits available to nonfamily managers are greater in 
family firms. Again, we note that prior to accepting employment, even stewards will base their 
choice of where to work on which employer offers them the greatest opportunity to maximize 
their utilities, and that calibrating economic goals is not as difficult as calibrating noneconomic 
goals under conditions of imperfect and asymmetric information. This leads us to conclude that 
although high-quality stewards may be willing to work in family firms, their utilities are more 
likely to be maximized through employment with firms that focus on economic goals, and are 
willing and able to offer a total compensation package that is commensurate with the manager's 
ability. Thus, we propose: 
 
 Proposition 3: The average capabilities of the pool of nonfamily managers who are 
attracted to work in small- and medium-sized family firms will tend to be lower than the 
average capabilities of the pool of nonfamily managers who are attracted to work in 




Up to this point, we have discussed the supply-side dynamics facing small- and medium-sized 
family firms in hiring and compensating nonfamily managers. However, the demand side of the 
coin potentially plays an even more crucial role in their employment and compensation 
decisions. In family firms, the desire to employ family managers is well known (e.g., Chua 
et al., 2009; Karra, Tracey, & Phillips, 2006). However, many family firms also seek to employ 
nonfamily managers to avoid inertia in strategic decision making (Mitchell, Morse, & 
Sharma, 2003; Schulze et al., 2001), prevent managerial entrenchment (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2001), and improve the quality of the management team (Chua et al.; De Massis, Chua, & 
Chrisman, 2008; Dunn, 1995). Attracting and retaining capable nonfamily managers may also be 
essential for firm growth and the institution of professional management practices (Klein & 
Bell, 2007; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Stewart & Hitt, 2012). As we have discussed above, family 
firms need to provide an attractive package of wage compensation and future income-earning 
opportunities to attract and retain high-quality managers. However, as we will explain below, 
family firms may be reluctant to do so, owing to their family-centered, noneconomic goals, such 
as providing jobs for family members (Chrisman, Chua, & Zahra, 2003). When providing jobs 
and promotions to family members is the norm, family members may be placed in key positions 
even if there are more capable nonfamily managers for such positions (Carney, 2005; 
Dyer, 2006). As Perrow (1972) explains, family firms often place more value on kinship ties than 
competence in choosing and promoting employees. Thus, as long as there are family members 
available to fill management positions in family firms, nonfamily managers might not be 
considered even if they possess superior capabilities. As noted above, this is because hiring 
nonfamily managers reduces the family's control of the firm, its ability to act altruistically to 
family members, and thus its socioemotional wealth (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, 2010). 8 
 
In addition, family involvement might have distinctive consequences for the compensation 
system of family firms (Ensley et al., 2007). For example, a performance-based compensation 
system may be inconsistent with the desire to distribute benefits equally among family members 
(Chua et al., 2009). Furthermore, the compensation of family managers may place bounds on the 
compensation paid to nonfamily managers even if the latter displays greater ability (Chua et al.). 
These considerations may negatively affect the willingness of family firms to provide 
competitive compensation to nonfamily managers. 
 
To explain the compensation decisions of small- and medium-sized family firms competing with 
nonfamily firms in hiring managers, we assume that the supply of managers is finite and that 
each firm will exert effort to hire managerial talent (Bognanno, 2001; O'Keeffe, Viscusi, & 
Zeckhauser, 1984). The utility for firm owners associated with hiring a manager is dependent 
upon the extent to which that manager contributes to the achievement of the owners' goals. As 
suggested above, we assume that nonfamily firms are driven solely or primarily by economic 
goals, whereas a family firm is expected to take into account a more balanced set of economic 
and noneconomic goals, which can vary in importance. Regardless, both types of firms attempt 
to maximize utility based upon the attainment of their goals. 
 
For both family and nonfamily firms, utility is increased as economic goal attainment increases. 
Economic goal attainment is represented by the firm's net income or profit, which for simplicity 
is modeled as the difference between the firm's gross income and the current wages paid to its 
managers. Following Weiss (1980), we assume that the wages of managers are an increasing 
function of their productivity rather than equal to their productivity. By this, we mean that firms 
with more qualified managers will obtain higher gross incomes and will pay their managers 
higher wages than firms with less qualified managers, but that the higher wages paid to better 
qualified managers will not necessarily consume the entire increase in gross income that those 
managers generate. In other words, we allow for positive and increasing net incomes in our 
model. Thus, if paying higher wages attracts higher quality managers, the utility of family as 
well as nonfamily owners should increase. 
 
However, the utility of the owners of family firms (but not of the owners of nonfamily firms) is 
also affected by the achievement of family-centered, noneconomic goals, which in our model 
represents the difference between the socioemotional benefits and socioemotional costs 
(Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008) associated with the employment of family and nonfamily 
managers. In general, employing family managers in the firm should increase family owners' 
utility because it enhances the family's control over firm decision making, and allows them to 
fulfill their obligations and altruistic impulses toward family members (cf. Gómez-Mejía 
et al., 2007; Karra et al., 2006; Schulze et al., 2001). Conversely, employing nonfamily managers 
should typically reduce the noneconomic utility of family owners, owing to a loss of family 
control and family involvement (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). Although there might 
be unusual circumstances where nonfamily management would generate noneconomic benefits 
for family owners (e.g., by minimizing conflicts that might ensue if forced to pick between two 
family members contending for the same position), these benefits would need to be greater than 
the noneconomic costs of reducing family control and involvement. Furthermore, as noted 
above, even nonfamily stewards are unlikely to make significant contributions to the 
achievement of noneconomic goals of family owners because of incomplete and asymmetric 
information. 9 
 
Since the baseline condition in family firms should be the employment of family managers, we 
consider how a switch to the employment of nonfamily managers will affect the utility of family 
owners. First, assuming that nonfamily managers have a positive impact on economic goal 
achievement, the utility of family owners would increase. However, this increase must be 
weighed against the loss in utility if employing nonfamily managers reduces the attainment of 
family-centered, noneconomic goals. Given diminishing marginal utility, the increases in 
economic performance associated with the employment of nonfamily managers will only 
increase the utility of family owners at a decreasing rate (Hicks, 1939; Marshall, 1890). On the 
other hand, the decrease in socioemotional wealth associated with hiring nonfamily managers 
will reduce utility at an increasing rate, depending upon the importance of noneconomic goals. 
Therefore, the employment of a nonfamily manager of a given quality at a given wage rate will 
always yield a lower utility for owners of family firms than for owners of nonfamily firms who 
experience no offsetting declines in utility from a loss of socioemotional wealth. Furthermore, 
the net change in utility from hiring a nonfamily manager is likely to be negative for family 
owners for two reasons. First, family owners are loss-averse with respect to their socioemotional 
wealth, which means that any decrease in the ability to achieve noneconomic goals is likely to be 
felt much more strongly than the increase in the ability to achieve economic goals. Second, as 
discussed above, because family firms tend to restrict promotion opportunities and are reluctant 
to provide stock options to nonfamily managers, they must offer higher current wages than 
nonfamily firms to attract high-quality, nonfamily managers. But higher wages would reduce net 
incomes and decrease the economic utility of hiring high-quality, nonfamily managers. Thus, if 
family owners are utility maximizers, the following proposition must follow: 
 
 Proposition 4: As the importance of family-centered goals increases, the willingness of 
small- and medium-sized family firms to pay higher current wages to attract high-quality, 
nonfamily managers will decrease. 
 
Moving beyond the micro-level demand factors for managerial talent, another force that must be 
reckoned with is the number of firms in the relevant labor market that are seeking to hire 
managers. Family and nonfamily firms compete with each other to hire talent. As the number of 
firms competing for managerial talent increases, managerial compensation should rise and net 
income should fall for all firms, assuming that the supply of managerial labor is constant, or at 
least does not increase commensurate with the increase in demand (Bognanno, 2001; 
Eriksson, 1999; Main, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1993; O'Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1988). This would 
decrease the marginal utility of all firms. However, since the marginal disutility associated with a 
decline in socioemotional wealth would be unaffected, higher wages would increase the 
likelihood of a net decline in overall utility for owners of family firms relative to nonfamily 
firms. Thus, as the competition for managers goes up, we expect family firms to be less rather 
than more willing to offer higher wages to nonfamily managers than nonfamily firms. 10 
 
 
 Proposition 5: As competition in the market for managerial labor increases, the 
willingness of family firms to pay wages sufficient to hire high-quality, nonfamily 
managers will decrease. 
 
The Winner's Curse 
 
In the managerial labor market, job candidates receive bids from employers for their services 
(Joiner,2005). The perceived value of a candidate to an employer is reflected in the 
compensation, which is the bid for the talent. As defined earlier, the winner's curse results when 
a firm wins the recruiting competition for managers by overbidding relative to the contribution 
that those managers make toward goal achievement (Thaler, 1988). Thus, the winner's curse 
arises whenever the victors find that by winning they actually lose (i.e., the costs exceed the 
benefits). 
 
Several studies from experimental and nonexperimental settings have examined the process of 
recruitment as an auction, and demonstrate that the winner's curse arises when a bidder fails to 
accurately estimate the actual value of the manager (e.g., Harrison & List, 2007). Accuracy is 
difficult under conditions of bounded rationality. Incomplete and asymmetric information leads 
to uncertainty concerning the manager's productive ability and the minimum bid needed to 
counter the offers of other potential employers (Gibbons & Katz, 1991; Perri, 1995). 
Furthermore, bids are signals, and even when the signaler does not intend to deceive, bounded 
rationality can cause signals to be misleading (cf. Spence, 1973). For example, competitors may 
overestimate the talents of a manager and bid accordingly. These bids, in turn, could affect the 
estimates and bid of the focal firm. Furthermore, unrealistically positive assessments of their 
skills, plans, and ability to control events (Kahneman & Lovello, 1993) can lead even managers 
who behave as stewards to send overly optimistic signals about their future performance 
potential. 
 
Overbidding not only leads to a potential financial setback for the winning firm, but also creates 
discontent, owing to unmet performance expectations (Joiner, 2005). Family firm owners are 
more susceptible to both because of their pursuit of noneconomic goals, and bounded rationality. 
They are likely to experience the winner's curse when hiring nonfamily managers because their 
compensation and promotion policies reduce the quality of the available labor pool but not 
necessarily their performance expectations for the managers they do hire. Here, bounded 
rationality may obscure cause and effect. By contrast, nonfamily firms are likely to pursue 
compensation (e.g., stock options) and promotion policies (based on merit) that improve the 
quality of the available labor pool and reduce the probability of the winner's curse. In addition, 
because of noneconomic goals and strategic idiosyncrasies, family firms may need, but are 
generally less willing, to pay higher current wages to attract high-quality managerial talent. 
Finally, hiring nonfamily managers suggests that fewer family managers can be hired, which 
negatively affects the ability of family owners to achieve their noneconomic goals. By contrast, 
nonfamily firms without or with fewer noneconomic goals do not face these difficulties. 
 
As we have explained, the utility of family owners is a function of the extent to which economic 
and noneconomic goals are valued and achieved. Therefore, the utility to family owners relative 
to nonfamily owners of winning the competition to hire a particular nonfamily manager will 
become progressively lower as the pursuit of family-centered, noneconomic goals becomes more 
important to them. Again, this is because the marginal utility of family owners will decline at an 
increasing rate as noneconomic goals are sacrificed, and the rate of decline will be steeper as the 
importance of family-centered, noneconomic goals increases. Thus, if family owners wish to 
maintain or increase their utility, the performance expectations to which nonfamily managers 
will be held must be higher than would be the case in nonfamily firms where there are no 
offsetting losses of utility associated with hiring nonfamily managers. 
 
 Proposition 6: To the extent that small- and medium-sized family firms pursue family-
centered, noneconomic goals, their performance expectations for nonfamily managers 
will be higher than the performance expectations for nonfamily managers of small- and 
medium-sized, nonfamily firms. 
 
Likewise, to compensate for the loss of utility, family firms are likely to expect more effort from 
nonfamily managers than from family managers in order to produce a net income that 
compensates for the loss of socioemotional wealth. Put differently, if a family firm could hire a 
family or nonfamily manager for the same compensation, the latter would need to perform at a 
higher level for the family owner to obtain comparable utility, owing to the cost associated with 
sacrificing noneconomic goals. Again, this is because economic analysis suggests that the 
marginal utility of family firm owners (1) will increase at a decreasing rate as the firm gains 
additional net income from hiring a nonfamily manager, but (2) will also decrease at an 
increasing rate as noneconomic goals are forsaken by not hiring a family manager. This means 
that the increase in net income necessary to yield the same utility will be correspondingly greater 
if a nonfamily manager is hired than if a family manager is hired. Thus: 
 
 Proposition 7: To the extent that small- and medium-sized family firms pursue family-
centered, noneconomic goals, their performance expectations for nonfamily managers 
will be higher than their performance expectations for family managers. 
 
The winner's curse is a function of both performance expectations and outcomes. If nonfamily 
managers are able to produce more and more as the expectations of firm owners become greater 
and greater, then the winner's curse would not necessarily transpire because the net income of the 
firm could increase enough to offset losses of noneconomic utility. However, as family-centered, 
noneconomic goals take on greater significance, family owners are more likely to suffer the 
winner's curse when hiring nonfamily managers even if the economic performance of the firm is 
improved. This is a consequence of two factors. First, as we have explained, the potential trade-
off between the fulfillment of economic and noneconomic goals (e.g., Chua & Schnabel, 1986) 
requires economic performance to increase more than noneconomic benefits decrease just to 
maintain owner utility, let alone increase it. 11 Second, the capabilities of all managers have 
natural, albeit varying, limits. Combined, we reason that it will be less and less likely that the 
improvements in economic performance that occur by hiring nonfamily managers will match the 
expectations of family owners as the importance of noneconomic goals rises. 12 Moreover, the 
potential for stewardship among nonfamily managers does not ameliorate the situation. Although 
the pro-organizational tendencies of stewards suggest that they will attempt to work up to their 
abilities, they remain boundedly rational with finite capabilities. 
 
 Proposition 8: As family-centered, noneconomic goals become more important, the 
likelihood that the performance of nonfamily managers will meet the expectations of 
family owners will decline. 
 
As discussed above, the pursuit of family-centered, noneconomic goals increases the odds of the 
winner's curse, owing in part to the finite capabilities of nonfamily managers. As stewards, these 
managers will attempt to work up to the limits of their capabilities. However, as explained 
below, the family business context may place constraints on their ability to realize their potential. 
 
Family control gives family owners the discretion to select idiosyncratic strategies and policies, 
and the pursuit of family-centered, noneconomic goals increases the probability that such 
idiosyncratic strategies will be followed (Carney, 2005). Unfortunately, nonfamily managers 
who have gained their experience in more conventional environments may not be able, at least in 
the short term, to utilize their knowledge, skills, and experience to full effect in family firms (Lee 
et al., 2003). 13 Indeed, Verbeke and Kano (2010, 2012) emphasize that compared with family 
managers, nonfamily managers face time compression diseconomies in adjusting to the 
noneconomic goals and strategic idiosyncrasies of family firms. As a consequence, even 
stewards may encounter difficulties because being willing to adjust is not the same as being able 
to adjust. Furthermore, regardless of whether nonfamily managers act as stewards or agents, 
strategic idiosyncrasies make it harder for family owners to gauge the extent to which nonfamily 
managers will be able to contribute to firm value. These factors have the combined effect of 
decreasing the mean and increasing the variance of the performance that can be obtained from 
nonfamily managers. If the probability of favorable performance outcomes decline and the 
performance expected for a given wage remains the same, the likelihood of the winner's curse 
would increase. 
 
Family owners have three potential responses. First, they can offer lower wages to nonfamily 
managers, which would have a downward influence on performance expectations. However, 
since nonfamily firms may not follow suit (conventional strategies do not increase the risk of the 
winner's curse), this response could further attenuate the quality of the pool of managers 
accessible to family firms. Second, family owners can offer nonfamily managers higher wages. 
Although higher wages would improve the quality of the labor pool, it would also result in 
higher performance expectations and would not eliminate bounded rationality. Furthermore, 
unless higher wages were also paid to family managers, which would reduce firm performance, 
the decline in noneconomic utility might be even more severe (Chua et al., 2009). Thus, the 
combined effects of higher performance and higher performance expectations would likely 
cancel out. 14 Finally, family owners could hire from inside the family. Family owners' lifelong 
interactions with other family members should reduce uncertainties about their ability to 
contribute to the firm (Block, 2011; Lee et al., 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Hiring family 
managers also increases rather than decreases socioemotional wealth. For both reasons—lower 
information asymmetries and positive contributions to noneconomic goal attainment—the 
probability of the winner's curse will be reduced. 
 
Thus, owing to both economic and noneconomic considerations, small- and medium-sized 
family firms will prefer, and in fact often be compelled, to hire family managers rather than 
nonfamily managers. Furthermore, as we have discussed, the idiosyncrasies of the family form of 
organization serve to exacerbate that preference, even when the risk of appropriation discussed 
by Lee et al. (2003) is absent. While a preference for family managers in order to achieve 
noneconomic goals is often viewed as a constraint on the development of human capital in 
family firms (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Dunn, 1995; Dyer, 2006; Memili & Barnett, 2008; 
Verbeke & Kano, 2012), this preference also helps them avoid the winner's curse in recruiting 
managerial talent, and therefore has an economic as well as a noneconomic rationale. Stated 
formally: 
 
 Proposition 9: To the extent that small- and medium-sized family firms pursue family-
centered, noneconomic goals and follow idiosyncratic strategies, family owners will 
prefer to hire family managers in order to increase the ability to achieve their economic 
and noneconomic goals. 
 







Even though we have outlined a case that appears to have broad generality, the heterogeneity of 
family firms (Melin & Nordqvist, 2007) suggests that there are a number of important 
contingencies that should be considered. Therefore, before concluding, we discuss how family 
size, firm size, and other factors might affect the hiring and compensation decisions of family 
firms. We focus specifically on firm and family size because, as noted earlier, these can 
influence the extent to which including nonfamily managers is necessary for firm sustainability, 
thereby altering how such decisions are framed. 
 
Family Size  
 
We expect that the size of the family will be negatively correlated with the propensity of family 
firms to hire and provide competitive levels of compensation to nonfamily managers. Simply 
put, as long as there are family members available, family owners should prefer to hire them for 
the reasons outlined in this paper (also see Ilias, 2006; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). In general, this 
means that if the size of the family makes noneconomic goals more important, the expected 
impact on the supply and demand of managerial labor and the probability of the winner's curse as 
reflected in our propositions will increase. 
 
On the other hand, as noted above, a lack of availability of qualified family members does not 
necessarily extinguish the desire to hire family managers. For example, the number of family 
members available to work in the family firm could be differentially constrained by either a lack 
of ability or a lack of willingness on the part of some or all of the family members (De Massis 
et al., 2008). In situations where the competence of some family members is judged deficient, 
hiring nonfamily managers is expected to be more acceptable than in situations where family 
members are not willing to join the firm. This is because in the former situation, family owners 
are able to choose how to maximize their utilities, while in the latter case a potentially desirable 
alternative is eliminated. 
 
Firm Size  
 
In contrast to the size of the family, we expect that the size of the family firm will be positively 
correlated with the propensity to hire and provide competitive levels of compensation to 
nonfamily managers. When a firm reaches a certain size, decisions must be made on whether 
overall utility is maximized by ceding partial control over the firm in order to permit continued 
growth, or limiting growth in order to maintain family control. For example, Ilias's (2006) 
analysis of the surgical instrument industry in the Sialkot region of Pakistan shows that under 
extreme conditions, the size of the family firm will be determined by the size of the family. 
 
Furthermore, as a firm grows, idiosyncratic knowledge is more likely to be institutionalized in 
the firm (Lee et al., 2003), making the employment of nonfamily managers less risky from the 
perspective of employer and employee. However, size and growth are likely to reduce, but not 
necessarily eliminate, the reluctance of family firms to hire and provide competitive 
compensation for nonfamily managers as long as family owners pursue family-centered, 
noneconomic goals. This reluctance appears to be particularly true for top-level positions in the 
firm (e.g., Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González, & Wolfenzon, 2007; Lee et al.; Poza 
et al., 1997). Thus, if firm size decreases the relative importance of the noneconomic goals of 
family owners, as well as information asymmetries for both family owners and potential 
nonfamily managers, the supply and demand considerations outlined in this paper and articulated 
in propositions 1–3 and 4–5, respectively, will be attenuated. Likewise, the probability and 
potential impact of the winner's curse should also decline in comparison to our contentions 




In addition to the size of the firm and the family, there are a number of other contingencies that 
could influence the policies of a family firm toward hiring, compensating, and promoting 
nonfamily managers by altering the relative importance of economic and noneconomic goals, or 
the ability of the firm to economize on bounded rationality. Generally speaking, anything that 
increases (decreases) the relative importance of family owners' economic goals or decreases 
(increases) the importance of their noneconomic goals will mitigate (aggravate) the relationships 
discussed in this paper and reflected in our propositions. 
 
For example, as Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) note, later generation family firms are apt to be less 
concerned with socioemotional wealth than first-generation family firms, which should lessen 
the resistance to the involvement of nonfamily managers even though the size of the family unit 
may actually be larger as it moves into the sibling partnership or cousin consortium stage of 
development (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). Similarly, Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2010) have shown that when family owners perceive a threat to the viability of the firm, an 
increase in economic performance will provide more utility than will be lost by a decrease in 
noneconomic performance. This occurs because in the realm of losses, decision makers become 
risk-seeking rather than risk-averse (Kahneman, 2003). Thus, in contrast to the situations we 
have discussed herein, if family owners perceive that upholding the status quo of family 
management will result in a certain economic loss, the attractiveness of hiring and providing 
compensation to nonfamily managers should be positively related to the size of the anticipated 
loss. 
 
With regard to bounded rationality, we assumed that managers were invariably stewards rather 
than potential agents. But as we have discussed, uncertainties associated with hiring nonfamily 
managers still exist in the absence of opportunism because signaling mechanisms are imperfect 
and employers cannot always distinguish between high- and low-quality managers 
(Akerlof, 1970; Burdett & Mortensen, 1981). Thus, in the decision to hire nonfamily managers, 
the problem with opportunistic behavior is that it exacerbates the asymmetric and imperfect 
information problems that already exist. In short, opportunism acts to further reduce the 




In this paper, we address the question of why, whenever possible, small- and medium-sized 
family firms tend to employ family members rather than nonfamily members as managers. The 
discussion also, of course, pertains to the preference of family firms to pursue intrafamily 
succession rather than professional management options (Stewart & Hitt, 2012). As we have 
shown, there are both economic and noneconomic reasons for the phenomenon, and these 
reasons are interrelated. The socioemotional value obtained through transgenerational family 
involvement and control is obviously a factor. What is less obvious is how noneconomic goals 
can influence the ability to hire high-quality nonfamily managers, as well as why hiring better 
qualified nonfamily managers will not necessarily enable family owners to obtain a level of firm 
performance that meets their expectations. To address this issue, we employ diminishing 
marginal utility theory to suggest that higher economic performance will usually increase utility 
only at a decreasing rate, whereas forfeiting noneconomic goals by employing nonfamily 
managers will decrease utility at an increasing rate in accordance with the importance of those 
goals. What this means is that in all probability, family owners will suffer the winner's curse—
overpaying for a set of uncertain benefits—not because of opportunism on the part of managers 
but because of bounded rationality, along with a desire to counteract the loss of socioemotional 
wealth. As we have argued, the winner's curse can occur even if the performance of the family 
firm increases relative to what it had previously been under the direction of family managers. 
Furthermore, when this notion is combined with recognition of how the idiosyncrasies of family 
firms affect the bounded rationality of nonfamily managers, we are able to explain why hiring 
family managers often makes sense economically as well as noneconomically even if nonfamily 
managers behave as stewards rather than agents. 
 
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing an economic analysis that more fully 
explains the motivations that influence the preferences of family owners with regard to the 
composition and compensation of the firm's management team. We show that the preference for 
family managers is a function of a complex set of factors, including economic and noneconomic 
goals, bounded rationality, labor market characteristics, and performance aspirations. Thus, 
while higher current wages for nonfamily managers could at least ameliorate the disadvantages 
of family firms in competing with nonfamily firms for high-quality, nonfamily managers, family 
firms are likely to be hesitant to pursue that course of action. We show that even if family firms 
are able to hire such managers, the potential for overbidding could cause the resulting economic 
performance to fall short of expectations. As we explain, overbidding is a consequence of 
bounded rationality—family owners cannot fully know the capabilities of nonfamily managers 
beforehand, and nonfamily managers cannot fully understand or contribute to the achievement of 
the noneconomic goals of family owners. Thus, even stewards are likely to be found wanting 
because family owners will desire to counteract the loss of noneconomic utility with greater 
economic utility, and consequently will expect a level of performance that is apt to exceed the 
capabilities of nonfamily managers, regardless of quality. In short, the concept of the “winner's 
curse” further explains why family owners may be reluctant and/or unable to professionalize the 
management structure of their firms, and why doing so may lead to less than satisfactory results. 
We also contribute to the literature by demonstrating that the adverse selection problems 
associated with family firms hiring nonfamily managers do not depend upon the application of 
agency theory (Burkart et al., 2002; Chua et al., 2009) or transaction cost theory (Lee et al., 2003; 
Pollak, 1985; Williamson, 1985), both of which assume the possibility of opportunism. 
Naturally, when opportunism is present in addition to information asymmetries, the situation we 
have described will become more severe. However, while opportunism may exacerbate the 
above-mentioned adverse selection problems that family firms face when hiring nonfamily 
managers, it is not required to demonstrate them because they are rooted in bounded rationality, 
not necessarily dysfunctional pursuit of self-interest. As a consequence, our analysis suggests 
that regardless of whether nonfamily managers behave as stewards or agents, there are still 
compelling reasons for family firms to hire family managers. 
 
This contribution is of particular importance for two reasons. First, the bounded rationality 
associated with the family form of governance has not been fully considered in the literature. Yet 
the involvement of a mix of family and nonfamily members, the importance of noneconomic 
goals (Chrisman et al., 2012), and the propensity of family firms to follow idiosyncratic 
strategies (Carney, 2005) that are often dependent upon tacit knowledge (Gedajlovic & 
Carney, 2010) suggest that bounded rationality could be a more important problem in family 
firms than nonfamily firms. As Mitchell et al. (2003) suggest, overlaying family issues onto firm 
issues factorially increases the cognitions with which nonfamily employees must contend. We 
extend their work by arguing that these complexities apply to and influence the decision making 
of family owners as well. Simply put, how family firms economize on bounded rationality 
deserves more attention, a point that is emphasized by our treatment of hiring and compensation 
decisions. 
 
Furthermore, by explicitly dealing with bounded rationality rather than both bounded rationality 
and opportunism, we were able to demonstrate that even if nonfamily managers behave as 
stewards, the problems of hiring and compensating nonfamily managers do not disappear 
because stewardship is only possible after an individual is hired, never before (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1994). Stewards will not necessarily subsume their self-interest when evaluating 
career opportunities, and bounded rationality can lead high-quality stewards to prefer nonfamily 
employers. Bounded rationality also creates uncertainties with regard to the characteristics and 
qualities of stewards as well as agents. It can make goal alignment and achievement difficult 
regardless of intentions. Thus, more work is needed to understand how bounded rationality 
influences the behavior of stewards. This is important because stewardship theory does not 
explicitly incorporate the implications of bounded rationality into its descriptions or predictions 
of behavior. For example, incorporating bounded rationality, not to mention bounded reliability 
(Verbeke & Greidanus, 2009), into stewardship theory would suggest that monitoring is still 
necessary to reduce the impact of imperfect and asymmetric information, even though it might 
not be needed to control aberrant behavior. Likewise, incentive systems may still be useful to 
signal priorities among multiple goals and reinforce the efficacy of desired behaviors. Because 
bounded rationality constrains the ability of all managers to make effective choices in the 
interests of owners, and indeed even to fully understand those interests, opportunism simply 
increases the need for monitoring and incentives rather than creating the need, as is commonly 
thought in the literature (e.g., Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). In fact, because they provide 
information, monitoring and incentive systems may actually be beneficial to nonfamily managers 
as well as family owners, if not taken to extremes. 
 
Implications for Research 
 
In terms of future research, the relationship between the composition and compensation of the 
management teams in family firms discussed in this paper deserves further study. Some family 
firms may eschew family-centered, noneconomic goals and seek to overcome the perceptions 
that their behavior is shaped in accordance with such goals. It would, therefore, be interesting to 
understand the signals that these family firms might use to build a reputation for professional 
management practices in order to avoid or nullify some of the problems described in this paper, 
as well as the effectiveness of those signals. Furthermore, although we suggest that small- and 
medium-sized family firms will usually need, but may not be willing, to pay nonfamily managers 
more than nonfamily firms to attract similar talent, research is needed to better understand the 
practices in which such firms actually engage and the outcomes of those practices. Whether, 
when, and which family firms will systematically underbid to avoid the problems discussed in 
this paper or overbid to obtain managers who are more capable than family managers is an 
empirical question, and of course depends in part on the relative value of achieving different 
goals, as well as the competitive situation. Research is needed to shed light on such issues which, 
as shown by our analysis, are much more complex than they might initially appear. For example, 
research on how family firms adjust their goals, strategies, or human resource policies to avoid 
the winner's curse is needed. 
 
Implications for Practice 
 
Our paper also contributes to practice by highlighting the importance of the precontractual stage 
of the hiring process of nonfamily managers in small- and medium-sized family firms. When 
formal monitoring systems and incentives are absent or insufficient, as is often the case in family 
firms (e.g., Chua et al., 2009), diligence at the precontractual stage of the employment of 
nonfamily managers becomes more important even if opportunism is not expected or 
forthcoming. Family firms may increase their odds of employing nonfamily managers who fit 
their needs if they are able to recognize and openly communicate their priorities during the 
selection process. Likewise, nonfamily managers need to attempt to communicate their needs 
and endeavor to understand and adapt to the priorities of family owners in order to increase the 
chance of a satisfying and successful employment experience. Thus, family owners and 
nonfamily managers need to appreciate that there will be some differences in their goals, and 
therefore the strategies that they believe are necessary to achieve those goals. Family and 
nonfamily stakeholders will be able to work together more easily and more effectively if both 
can exhibit tolerance toward the expanded goal set that will be required to meet their common 
and disparate needs (cf. Villanueva & Sapienza, 2009). Furthermore, the application of formal 
monitoring and incentive systems can help reduce information asymmetries, and lead to fairer 
and more satisfactory outcomes for family owners and nonfamily managers alike. 
 
In conclusion, we use economic analysis focused on noneconomic goals, bounded rationality, 
and the winner's curse to enrich our understanding about why family owners favor family 
managers over nonfamily managers in small- and medium-sized family firms. We hope our 
exposition will shed new light on the problems facing family firms, and prompt further research 




1. Family firms are defined by a family's involvement in ownership and governance, and a 
vision for how the firm will benefit the family, potentially across generations 
(Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2010; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999). 
 
2. Family-centered, noneconomic goals are closely tied to the socioemotional wealth of the 
firm, and therefore include a variety of objectives specifically related to desirable 
nonpecuniary aspects of firm ownership, such as control and influence, identification, 
social ties, emotional attachment, and firm renewal through transgenerational family 
succession (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Differences in the relative weights 
attached to these goals could influence the relationships described in this paper. 
 
3. Managers are defined as the key decision makers in a firm (Eisenhardt, 1999; Shrivastava 
& Grant, 1985). 
 
4. A lemons problem occurs when it is difficult to distinguish good and bad quality prior to 
use or employment, and asymmetric information about quality exists between buyers and 
sellers, employers and employees, etc. 
 
5. Although there may be specific instances where nonfamily managers can contribute to 
noneconomic goal achievement, the difficulties in articulating, communicating, and 
measuring such goals place limits on their ability to do so. Thus, bounded rationality, as 
well as nonfamily status, can constrain the ability of stewards to contribute to the 
achievement of the noneconomic goals of family firms (Chua et al., 2009; Davis 
et al., 1997). 
 
6. Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) introduce the concept of bounded reliability and note that 
in addition to opportunism, failed commitments among individuals can occur from 
benevolent preference reversals associated with reprioritization and over-commitment. 
Since these can lead to the same outcomes as opportunistic behavior, we do not deal with 
them in this paper. However, it is important to note that although stewards will not be 
opportunistic, both stewards and agents can be boundedly reliable as well as boundedly 
rational (Verbeke & Kano, 2010, 2012). 
 
7. Some of the disadvantage of family firms might be offset if they provided better career 
training (cf. Miyazaki, 1977); unfortunately, evidence suggests that the training offered to 
nonfamily managers in family firms is inferior to the training offered in nonfamily firms 
(Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Reid & Adams, 2001), which may be related to their 
reluctance to professionalize (Stewart & Hitt, 2012) and tendency to undervalue their 
nonfamily labor force (Verbeke & Kano, 2010, 2012). 
 
8. Although the loss of utility is presumed to occur to a lesser extent if there are no family 
managers available, some loss could still occur since the desire to maintain family control 
is likely to remain; just because people cannot always get what they want does not 
necessarily mean they no longer want it or do not feel the loss. Evidence of this comes 
from the observed use of a “seat-warmer strategy” involving the appointment of interim 
nonfamily managers until qualified (albeit potentially less capable) family members 
become available (Lee et al., 2003). 
 
9. However, it is possible that the contributions to the economic goals of the family firm by 
nonfamily managers could also contribute to its noneconomic goals (Zellweger & 
Nason, 2008). Examples include managerial actions that improve firm performance and 
generate social capital or enhance the reputation of both the firm and family. 
 
10. Furthermore, if the gap in the wages (and therefore total compensation) offered by family 
and nonfamily firms increases, the sorting problem discussed above could be expected to 
get worse, whether family firms attempt to offset wage differentials through 
nonpecuniary benefits or not. Consequently, the average quality of the pool of nonfamily 
managers available to family firms should decline as competition for managers increases. 
 
11. However, as suggested earlier, there may be circumstances when the achievement of 
economic and noneconomic goals are compatible such as when they both require a 
favorable reputation for the firm (Zellweger & Nason, 2008). 
 
12. The unrealistic and unfulfilled expectations that characterize the winner's curse can also 
occur when hiring family managers. Thus, family owners will expect family managers to 
contribute to the fulfillment of noneconomic goals as well as economic goals, although 
perhaps more to the former than the latter. However, family managers frequently do not 
deliver on either expectation (cf. Schulze et al., 2001). Indeed, the well-known and 
recurrent conflict between family incumbents and family successors documented in the 
literature (e.g., Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004) suggests that the bundle of noneconomic 
and economic utilities expected from hiring family managers may not always materialize. 
 
13. Shifting from one family firm to another will not necessarily eliminate the problem 
because the variety of economic and noneconomic goals that family firms follow 
suggests that their strategies could be as different, if not more different, from each other 
as they are from the strategies of nonfamily firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). 
 
14. Here, it is important to point out that higher wages expand the labor pool but not the 
ability of an individual manager. Furthermore, because managers are presumed stewards 
rather than agents, higher wages will not coax additional effort out of those managers. 
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